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Abstract
We consider nested utility function with nonhomothetic subutility
functions. We express demand functions for aggregate goods in terms
of marshalian and hicksian demands associated with the standard con-
sumer problem of maximization of aggregate utility function. We also
presents a simple method of calibrating such a demand system.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers consumers facing the standard problem of max-
imizing utility function in the form u(x) = u(v1(x1), . . . , vk(xk)), where
x = col(x1, . . . , xk) and xi is a vector of goods belonging to i-th group of
goods and vi(xi) is any sub-utility function, possibly nonhomothetic, satisfy-
ing standard regularity conditions. Such a problem arise naturally in general
equilibrium modeling, e.g. in models with endogenous leisure choice. In such
a case x1 would represent a vector of consumption goods and x2 a vector
of differentiated labor supply. One requires a nonhomothetic subutility v1
in order to obtain empirically valid consumption demands, since in case of
homothetic subutility v1(x1) all income elasticities would equal 1.
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Weak separation of utility function between goods in different groups
allows for considering two stage budgeting problem, where in the first stage
consumers split total expenditures between different groups of goods and in
the second stage choose optimal consumption of goods in given group subject
to total expenditure on given group of goods. However in the nonhomothetic
case the first stage problem is not standard, since the budget constraint is not
linear. This greatly complicates optimal solution to the first stage budgeting
problem. For example if the aggregate utility is the Cobb-Douglas function,
then optimal expenditure on given group of goods is no longer constant share
of total expenditure.
In order to obtain empirically reasonable demands one requires appro-
priately flexible utility functions. However a set of available tractable util-
ity functions is very small, actually restricted to the CES utility function.
Obtaining a less restrictive demands requires considering demand systems
obtained applying the Roy’s identity to an indirect utility function or the
Sheppard’s lemma to an expenditure function. A set of such demand system
is very wide and includes among others locally regular Translog or AIDS sys-
tems and globally regular1 CDES and AIDADS systems. Demand systems
generated by indirect utility function are especially convenient, since this
technique allows for obtaining simple, flexible, globally regular demands2.
However in such cases we are not able to maximize aggregate utility directly,
since the utility function is not expressed in closed form.
To overcome this difficulty we are going to express solution to the first
stage problem in terms of solution to the standard utility maximization prob-
lem, i.e. maximization of given utility function subject to linear budget con-
straint. In this way exact function form of a utility function is not required.
We also show that elasticity of substitution between aggregate goods and
income elasticity can be expressed in terms of income and substitution elas-
ticity associated with the standard optimization problem. This allows for a
simple calibration of parameters of the utility function u based on market
shares, income and substitution elasticity between aggregate goods.
There is little literature on aggregating nonhomothetic utility functions.
To our knowledge only McDougall (2003) considered such a problem an de-
rived solution to the first stage problem in case of Cobb-Douglas aggregate
utility and CDES subutility functions. However his method cannot be ap-
plied to any more general aggregate utility function.
1A demand system is globally regular, if is homogenous and the Slutsky’s matrix is
symmetric and the negatively semidefinite Slutsky’s matrix for any positive prices and
incomes. If these conditions are satisfied only at given prices and expenditure, then a
demand system is call locally regular.
2See Cooper and McLaren (2006).
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In section 2 we repeat results in standard consumer theory and introduce
notation. In section 3 we solve the first stage problem, elasticity of substitu-
tion between aggregate goods and income elasticity are considered in sections
4 and 5. In section 6 we consider calibration of utility parameters. Finally
section 7 concludes.
2 Consumer choice
We consider a consumer faced with possible consumption bundles in con-
sumption set X = RK+ , where RK+ is the nonnegative orthant in RK . The
consumer is assumed to have preferences on the consumption bundles in X
given by the utility function u : X → R, which is assumed to be a strictly
quasi-concave, increasing and differentiable function. Let M be the fixed
amount of money available to a consumer, and let p = col(p1, . . . , pK) be the
vector of prices of goods, additionally let pi > 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , K. The
consumer chooses an affordable consumption bundle x = col(x1, . . . , xK) ∈ X
that maximizes utility function u:
max
x∈X
u(x)
s.t.
∑
i
pixi ≤M (1)
Let the utility u is weakly separable in the subvectors {x1, . . . , xk}, where
xi = col(xi1, . . . , xini) ∈ Rni+ .= Xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , k, and n1 + · · · + nk = K,
that is
u(x) = v(v1(x1), . . . , vk(xk)) (2)
for some functions vi : Rni+ → R, i = 1, . . . , k. Subutility functions vi,
i = 1, . . . , k, and aggregate utility function, v are assumed to be strictly
quasi-concave, increasing and differentiable functions. Then also the utility
function u posses these properties. Similarly, let pi = col(pi1, . . . , pini) is a
vector of prices of goods in k-th group and let p = col(p1, . . . , pk) is a vector
of prices of all goods.
Let x∗ is a solution to the problem (1) with weakly separable utility
function (2). Let M∗i is an optimal expenditure on goods in group i,
M∗i =
∑
j
pijx
∗
ij
3
Then x∗i solves also
max
xi∈Xi
vi(xi1, . . . , xiki)
s.t.
∑
j
xijpij ≤M∗i (3)
Since utility function u is strictly quasi-concave, consumer preferences are
strictly convex, and solution to (1) is unique. Similarly, solution to (3) given
subgroup expenditure level, M∗i , is also unique. Hence, given optimal ex-
penditure on goods in group i we can find optimal consumption of goods
in i-th group maximizing subutility function subject to the standard budget
constraint.
Let xmi (pi,M∗i ) is an optimal consumption bundle in i-th group given
prices of goods, pi, and total expenditure on goods in i-th group, M∗i . Let
wi(pi,M
∗
i ) is an indirect utility function associated with the consumer choice
problem (3), i.e.
wi(pi,M
∗
i ) = vi(x
∗
i1(pi,M
∗
i ), . . . , x
∗
ini
(pi,M
∗
i ))
and let ei(pi, u) is an expenditure function associated with (3), that is mini-
mum cost of achieving a fixed level of subutility
ei(pi, u) = min
xi∈Xi
∑
j
xijpij s.t. vi(xi) ≥ u
Now we can write the overall maximization problem of the consumer (1) as
max
v1,...,vk
v(v1, . . . , vk)
s.t.
∑
i
ei(pi, vi) ≤M (4)
where vi is level of subutility from consumption goods in i-th group. Let v∗i ,
i = 1, . . . , k solves (4). Then M∗i = e(pi, v∗i ). Since there exists exactly one
solution to (1), solution to (4) is unique.
3 The first stage problem
Let Yi = {vi(xi), xi ∈ Xi}. Let fi : Yi → R+ is any strictly increasing,
differentiable function, such that fi(Yi) = R+. Then there exist strictly
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increasing, differentiable functions gi(x) such that gi(fi(x)) = x and we can
write the problem (4) as
max
x˜i∈R+
v˜(x˜1, . . . , x˜k)
s.t.
∑
i
ei(pi, gi(x˜i)) ≤M (5)
where x˜i = fi(vi) and
v˜(x˜1, . . . , x˜k)
.
= v(g1(x˜1), . . . , gk(x˜k)) : Rk+ → R
Observe that the function v˜ is strictly quasi-concave, increasing, and dif-
ferentiable, since v˜ is a composition of increasing, strictly quasi-concave,
differentiable function v and strictly increasing, differentiable functions gi.
Proposition 3.1. For any strictly quasi-concave, continuous, increasing
function v˜ : Rk+ → R, and for any strictly increasing, continuous functions gi,
i = 1, . . . , k, there exists exactly one solution to (5) for any M > 0, pi > 0,
i = 1, . . . , k. Additionally the budget constraint is satisfied with equality.
We can interpret x˜i as an aggregate good index and define marshalian
demand functions xmi (p,M) which gives optimal consumption of aggregate
good x˜i at given prices p and total expenditure M . Observe that xmi (p,M)
is a homogenous of degree zero function in p and M , since all expenditure
functions ei(pi, gi(xi)) are homogenous of degree 1 in prices. Let us define
aggregate price index, p˜i, of i-th type aggregate good as
p˜i =
ei(pi, gi(x˜i))
x˜i
Generally, the price index p˜i depends not only on i-th group prices, pi, but
also depends on level of consumption of aggregate good x˜i. In case of homo-
thetic subutility function vi we can take fi(vi) = ei(p0i , vi), which is a strictly
increasing function, and gi(xi) = wi(p0i , xi), where p0i > 0 is arbitrary base
price vector. Then gi(fi(vi)) = vi and
p˜i =
ei(pi, vi)
ei(p0i , vi)
=
e1i (pi)× e2i (vi)
e1i (p
0
i )× e2i (vi)
=
e1i (pi)
e1i (p
0
i )
since in case of homothetic utility function vi, there exists functions e1i , e2i ,
such that ei(pi, vi) = e1i (pi) × e2i (vi). However, in case of non-homothetic
subutility function vi, by the Gorman’s theorem, there does not exists any
variable transformation given by the function fi, such that price index p˜i is
a function of i-th group of goods prices, pi.
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Let us consider a standard consumer’s problem
max
x˜∈Rk+
v˜(x˜1, . . . , x˜k)
s.t.
∑
i
p˜ix˜i ≤M
(6)
where utility function v˜ satisfies conditions from proposition 3.1. Then, for
any p˜ > 0, M > 0, there exists exactly one solution to (6). Let xmsi (p˜,M),
xhsi (p˜, u), ws(p˜,M), es(p˜, u) are respectively a marshalian demand function,
a hicksian demand function, an indirect utility, and an expenditure function
associated with the problem (6).
We are going to express solution to (5) in terms of solution to (6). We
have
Theorem 3.2. Let the utility function v˜(x˜) is a C2, differentiably strictly
quasi-concave, differentiably strictly increasing function. Let the indirect util-
ity function ws is differentiably strictly quasi-convex. Let for i = 1, . . . , k,
ei(pi, gi(x˜i)) is differentiably increasing function. Let xmsi (p,M) > 0 is a
marshalian demand at prices p and total expenditure M and let xhsi (p, u) de-
notes hicksian demand at prices p and aggregate utility level u, associated
with the standard consumer’s problem (6). Then solution to the problem (5)
is given implicitly by
x˜∗i = x
ms
i (pˆ, Mˆ) x˜
∗
i = x
hs
i (pˆ, u) (7)
where pˆ = col(pˆ1, . . . , pˆk), and
pˆi =
∂ei(pi, gi(x˜
∗
i ))
∂x˜i
Mˆ =M +
∑
i
x˜∗i × (pˆi − p˜i)
Additionally there exists exactly one solution to (7) for any prices p > 0,
total income M and utility level u.
If all subutility functions are homothetic, and fi(vi) = ei(p0i , vi), then
pˆi = p˜i and demand system (7) is reduced to the standard demand.
We assume that the we know demands associated with the standard max-
imization problem for a utility function v(g1(x˜1, . . . , gk(x˜k), not with the util-
ity function v(v˜1, . . . , v˜k). One can easily derive solution to the problem (5)
if standard demands associated with the utility function v(v˜1, . . . , v˜k) are
known. However in this case elasticity of substitution between aggregate
goods cannot be expressed as a simple function of elasticity of substitution
associated with the standard demands.
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4 Elasticity of substitution
The partial (Allen-Uzawa) elasticity of substitution of the i’th and the
j’th aggregate good, i, j = 1, . . . , k, at given consumption bundle x˜ is
σAESij (x˜) =
∑
k v˜i(x˜)x˜i
x˜ix˜j
× |Bij(x˜)||B(x˜)|
where |B(x˜)| is the determinant of the bordered hessian matrix
B(x˜) =

0 v˜1(x˜) · · · v˜k(x˜)
v˜1(x˜) v˜11(x˜) · · · v˜1k(x˜)
...
... . . .
...
v˜k(x˜) v˜k1(x˜) · · · v˜kk(x˜)

and |Bij(x˜)| is the determinant of the cofactor of v˜ij(x˜). Let x˜∗ is an optimal
consumption bundle at prices p and total expenditure M . Let u is an aggre-
gate utility level u obtained from consumption of x˜. From the proposition
(3.2) we have x˜∗ = xhs(pˆ, u), hence x˜ solves the standard optimization prob-
lem (6) at prices pˆ and utility level u. Using the fact that for the standard
optimization problem the Allen-Uzawa elasticity can be expressed in terms
of expenditure function (Uzawa (1962))∑
k v˜i(x˜
∗)x˜∗i
x˜∗i x˜
∗
j
× |Bij(x˜
∗)|
|B(x˜∗)| =
esij(pˆ, u)e
s(pˆ, u)
esi (pˆ, u)e
s
j(pˆ, u)
and applying the Sheppard’s identity for the standard optimization problem
we have
σAESij (p,M) =
∂xsh(pˆ, u)
∂pˆ
× Mˆ
x˜∗i x˜
∗
j
= σAES,sij (pˆ, Mˆ) (8)
where σAES,sij (pˆ, Mˆ) is the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution for the stan-
dard optimization problem evaluated at prices pˆ and total expenditure Mˆ .
Similarly, the Morishima elasticity of substitution, σMESij at given con-
sumption prices p and total expenditure, M is given by
σMESij (p,M) =
v˜j(x˜
∗)
x˜∗i
× |Bij(x˜
∗)|
|B(x˜∗)| −
v˜j(x˜∗)
x˜∗j
× |Bij(x˜
∗)|
|B(x˜∗)|
=
v˜j(x˜
∗)x˜∗j
v˜i(x˜∗)x˜∗i
× (σAESij (x˜∗)− σAESjj (x˜∗)) = σMES,sij (pˆ, Mˆ)
where σMES,sij (pˆ, Mˆ) is the Morishima elasticity of substitution for the stan-
dard optimization problem evaluated at prices pˆ and total expenditure Mˆ .
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5 Income elasticity
Let x˜ = xm(p,M) is a solution to (5) at prices p and total income M .
Differentiating with respect to M yields
ηi(p,M)
.
=
∂xmi (p,M)
∂M
× M
x˜i
=
∑
j
εsij(pˆ, Mˆ)× ζˆj(p,M) + ηsi (pˆ, Mˆ)× θˆ(p,M)
where εsij(pˆ, Mˆ) and ηsi (pˆ, Mˆ) are respectively marshalian price elasticity and
income elasticity for the demand associated with the standard consumer
problem (6) at prices pˆ and total income Mˆ and
ζˆj =
∂pˆj
∂M
× M
pˆj
ζ˜j =
∂p˜j
∂M
× M
p˜j
θˆ =
∂Mˆ
∂M
× M
Mˆ
Differentiating p˜ and Mˆ with respect to M yields
θˆ =
(
1−
∑
i
(ηi + ζ˜i)× si
)
×M
Mˆ
+
∑
i
(ηi + ζˆi)× sˆi
where
s˜i =
x˜ip˜i
M
sˆi =
x˜ipˆi
Mˆ
We have
∑
i ηisˆi = −
∑
i sˆj ζˆj + θˆ since the Engel and Cournot aggregation
hold for demand xms(pˆ, Mˆ). Then
∑
i ηisˆi = (1−
∑
i(ηi+ζ˜i)×si)×MMˆ+
∑
i ηisˆi
and ∑
i
(ηi + ζ˜i)si = 1 (9)
Condition (9) implies, that the Engel aggregation condition holds for aggre-
gated goods only if
∑
i ζ˜isi = 0. Condition (9) also implies implies, that
θˆ = 1 +
∑
i(ζˆi − ζ˜i)× sˆi. Further
ζ˜i = ηi × ( pˆi
p˜i
− 1) ζˆi = ηi × ∂
2ei(pi, gi(x˜i))
∂x˜i∂x˜i
× x˜i
pˆi
We have
∂2ei(pi, gi(x˜i))
∂x˜i∂x˜i
=
∂2ei(pi, gi(x˜i))
∂v˜2i
×
(∂gi(x˜i)
∂x˜i
)2
+pˆi × ∂
2gi(x˜i)
∂x˜2i
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Let x˜i = ei(p0i , v˜i). Then gi(x˜i) = wi(p0i , x˜i) and ∂gi(x˜i)/∂x˜i = ∂wi(p0i , x˜i)/∂M ,
∂2gi(x˜i)/∂x˜
2
i = ∂
2wi(p
0
i , x˜i)/∂M
2. Since wi(pi, ei(pi, v˜i)) = v˜i, thus, ∂ei(pi, v˜i)/∂v˜i
= (∂wi(pi, ei(pi, v˜i))/∂M)
−1, and
∂2ei(pi, gi(x˜i))
∂v˜i∂v˜i
= − ∂
2wi(pi, ei(pi, gi(x˜i)))/∂M
2
(∂wi(pi, ei(pi, gi(x˜i)))/∂M)2
× pˆi
Observe that
∂2ei(p
0
i , gi(x˜i))
∂x˜i∂x˜i
= − ∂
2wi(p
0
i , x˜i)/∂M
2
(∂wi(p0i , x˜i)/∂M)
2
× pˆi ×
(∂gi(x˜i)
∂x˜i
)2
+pˆi × ∂
2gi(x˜i)
∂x˜2i
= 0
hence ζˆ(p0,M) = 0. Additionally, p˜i(p0i ,M) = pˆi(p0i ,M) = 1, hence ζ˜i(p0i ,M) =
0. Finally
ηi(p
0,M) = ηsi (1k,M) (10)
where 1k is a k × 1 vector with all elements equal 1.
6 A note on calibration
Equations (8) and (10) allows for calibrating aggregate demand based
on shares of aggregate goods in total expenditure, elasticity of substitution
and income elasticity. Let M0 and p0 is a base level of total expenditures
and prices. Then consumption of an i-th aggregate good is xMi (p0,M) =
xmsi (1k,M). Since aggregate prices are equal 1, share of an i-th aggregate
goods in total expenditure is equal
s0i =
1
M
× xmsi (1k,M)
From (8) and (10) we have also
σAESij (p
0,M) = σAES,sij (1k,M) ηi(p
0,M) = ηsi (1k,M)
Finally one can calibrate sub-utility functions based on conditional demands.
7 Conclusions
We have shown that a solution the first stage utility maximization prob-
lem can be expressed in terms of demand associated with the standard op-
timization problem. This technique allows to find optimal consumption of
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aggregate goods when only marshalian or hicksian demand associated with
the standard maximization of aggregate utility is known, hence is applicable
to wide set of aggregate utility functions.
We have also derived elasticity of substitution between aggregate goods
and income elasticity. Elasticity of substitution and income elasticity are
equal to income and substitution elasticity of the standard demands allowing
for simple calibration of parameters of utility functions. However in case of
income elasticity this property holds only at base prices.
10
A Proof of proposition 3.1
This proof is a simple extension of similar proposition in case of the
standard utility maximization problem.
Since functions ei(pi, gi(x˜i)) are increasing in x˜i for any i = 1, . . . , k, the
function
∑
i ei(pi, gi(x˜i)) is increasing in all x˜i, hence quasi-convex. This
implies that the set C .= {x˜ ∈ Rk+ :
∑
i ei(pi, gi(x˜i)) ≤ M} is convex and
nonempty for any M > 0. Since v˜ is strictly quasi-convex, there exists at
most one solution to (5).
For i = 1, . . . , k, ei(pi, gi(x˜i)) ≤ M , since ei(pi, gi(x˜i)) ≥ 0. Hence, if x˜ ∈
C, then x˜i ≤ fi(wi(pi,M)), and the set C is bounded. The set C is also closed
since expenditure functions ei(pi, gi(xi)) are continuous, hence compact. By
the Weierstrass’ Extreme Value Theorem, there exists a solution, x∗ to (5).
Let x˜∗ solves (5) and
∑
i ei(pi, gi(x˜
∗
i )) < M . Then, there exists x˜′ > x˜∗
and x˜′ ∈ C. We have v˜(x˜∗) = v˜(x˜′), since the function v˜ is increasing. Let
α ∈ (0, 1) is any scalar. Then, by the strong quasi-concavity of v˜, v˜(αx˜∗ +
(1− α)x˜′) > v˜(x˜∗). This contradicts optimality of x˜∗.
B Proof of proposition 3.2
Assumptions imply that xmsi (p,M) is a C1 function.
The utility function v˜(x˜) satisfies for all x˜ ∈ Rk++
v˜(x˜) = min
q∈Rk+
ws(q, 1) s.t.
∑
i
qix˜i = 1 (11)
There exists exactly one solution to this problem, since ws is strictly quasi-
convex and set of feasible price vectors is compact. Let Ls is a lagrangian
associated with (11)
Ls = ws(q, 1)− µ(
∑
i
qix˜i − 1)
Let q∗ solves (11). Then there exists a lagrange multiplier µ∗, such that
∂w˜(q∗, 1)
∂qi
= µ∗xi > 0
∑
i
q∗i xi = 1
On the other hand if q∗ and µ∗ solves these conditions, then q∗ is a global
optimum, since the differentiable strictly quasi-convex function ws is also
pseudo-convex function. Hence
µ∗ =
∑
i
q∗i
∂w˜(q∗, 1)
∂qi
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Let as consider q∗ and µ∗ as functions of x˜, q∗ = q(x), µ∗ = µ(x). The
envelope theorem implies
∂v˜(x˜)
∂x˜i
= −µ(x˜)qi(x˜) µ(x) = −
∑
i
xi
∂v˜(x˜)
∂x˜i
(12)
Then, taking y = xms(−z/µ∗, 1) for given µ∗ and any z ∈ dom(∂v˜(y)/∂x˜),
we obtain ∂v˜(y)/∂x˜i = zi.
Let L is lagrangian associated with (5) is
L = v˜(x˜1, . . . , x˜k)− λ(
∑
i
p˜ix˜i −M)
Let x˜∗∗ solves (5). Since ei(pi, gi(x˜∗∗i ) is differentiably strictly increasing,
∂ei(pi, gi(x˜
∗∗
i )/∂x˜i > 0 and gradient of
∑
i p˜ix˜i evaluated at x˜
∗∗ has rank 1.
Then there exists a lagrange multiplier λ∗∗, such that
∂v˜(x˜∗∗)
∂x˜i
= λ∗∗ × pˆ∗∗i
∑
i
p˜∗∗i x˜
∗∗
i =M (13)
where p˜∗∗i and pˆ∗∗i are values of p˜i and pˆi evaluated at x˜∗∗. On the other hand if
x˜∗∗, λ∗∗, p˜∗∗, pˆ∗∗ solves these conditions, then x˜∗∗ is a global optimum, since
the differentiable strictly quasi-concave function v˜ is also pseudo-concave
function and
∑
i p˜ix˜i is a quasi-concave function since is increasing in x˜.
From (12) we have
µ(x∗∗) = −λ∗∗ ×M − λ∗∗
∑
i
x∗∗i × (pˆ∗∗i − p˜∗∗i )
hence, x∗∗ also solves
x∗∗ = xms(pˆ∗∗i ,M +
∑
i
x∗∗i × (pˆ∗∗i − p˜∗∗i )) (14)
For given λ∗∗, p˜∗∗, pˆ∗∗, and M , x∗∗ defined by (14) is a solution to (13).
But since there exists exactly one solution to (5), equation (14) determines
uniquely x∗∗, which is also solution to (5).
Let x˜∗ solves (5). Then x˜∗ also solves (6) at prices pˆ and income Mˆ .
Let u = v˜(x˜∗) is a utility level from consumption of consumption bundle x˜∗.
Then x∗ = xhs(pˆ, u), since x˜∗ delivers the same utility level in case of problem
(5) and (6).
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